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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This brief replies to the matters raised in the Tax
Commission brief. The format is that of plaintiff's earlier
brief, except that a new Point 3 has been added as to
matters presented here by the Commission for the first
time. In the discussion which follows, both taxpayers, The
Midland Telephone Company and Utah Telephone Company, are for brevity and convenience referred to together as "Midland."
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Tax Commission's description of the process by
which Midland's federal tax was computed suggests an
overall impression that the first step is the combining by
the parent of the subsidiaries' incomes and expenses into
a consolidated income figure, and that Midland's separate taxable income is thereafter artificially computed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Any such impression is incorrect. The Commission's brief
says (p. 2) that some of Midland's deductions are excluded initially and deducted after the consolidation. The
brief then states (see step (c), p. 2) that "allegedly"
each member "then" prepares its own separate, "recomputed" tax liability. The words in quotation marks are
added in the Commission's brief and do not appear in
the agreed statement (R 8).
In fact, the process operates in the reverse order and
is the opposite in substance. Midland's separate computation of its federal tax is the basic, first step (Tr. 30, 32).
It is that tax which Midland actually pays to the Internal Revenue Service. The items supposedly excluded
from the first step are in fact included and deducted in
the initial computation. The Midland witness testified,
referring to contributions as an example of such a deduction (Tr. 32) : "But it does not mean by any stretch
of the imagination that that company does not get to
deduct its contributions, it does so." Confusion about the
so-called excluded items appears initially in the record
(cf. fl7(a) with fl7(c); R 8), since such items must also
be kept account of for another purpose, that of assuring
that the deduction of these items does not exceed an
overall limitation imposed upon the federal consolidated
return. The quoted testimony was later submitted to clarify the process.
The point of the foregoing is this: the computation
process that all Continental subsidiaries (including Midland) must follow is the separate-company procedure.
This fact is basic to this case. As the Midland witness
stated (Tr. 34):
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"And because of one thing, our closing agreement
with the Internal Revenue Service which does
not give us an option of doing it any way other
than on a separate company basis and two, the
various and sundry public utility commissions
which also do not give us an option of how we
account for these things, we use a separate company calculation."
The single legal problem of this litigation emerges
from these central facts, testified to and uncontradicted:
Midland first computes its federal taxes separately (Tr.
31, 32). It delivers that tax, by a transfer of actual funds,
to its parent. Midland's parent is its sole agent for federal
taxation purposes. The parent prepares and files the
consolidated return of the entire Continental system and
sends in the indicated consolidated tax. If a subsidiary
incurs a loss, and if that loss lessens consolidated income,
the loss subsidiary gets a refund from Continental in the
amount of the tax effect of its loss (R 35). Such refund
would be the same had that subsidiary filed its federal
return separately (R 36). Neither Midland, nor the Continental system as a system, pays a greater or lesser or
different federal tax over the long run by reason of the
system's choice of filing a federal consolidated return
(R 44-45).
The Utah corporation franchise tax return of Midland is filed by it directly and separately. The taxes-paid
deduction taken by Midland in that computation is Midland's separately computed and actually paid federal tax.
The Tax Commission's assignment method is described at pp. 4-5 of its brief. That theory would limit
Midland's allowable deduction to a figure arrived at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by determining the ratio that Midland's income bears to
the incomes of all the profit-making subsidiaries, multiplied by the federal tax of the consolidated group. The
practical effect is seen most clearly in a simplified
example:
Assume that the Continental system consists of
three operating utility subsidiaries: Midland, having income of $1,000 from Utah operations; a
Montana corporation, having income of $1,000
from Montana; and an Alaska corporation, having
a $1,000 loss upon Alaska operations. Assume a
50% federal tax rate.
The federal tax result would be: Midland
would remit its separate-company tax of $500 to
the parent. Montana would remit a $500 tax to
the parent. On the consolidated income of $1,000
($1,000 plus $1,000 minus $1,000) the consolidated tax is $500. Alaska would receive a $500
tax refund from the parent. The parent's books
would net out at zero.
As to the Utah franchise tax, on these facts,
the Commission's assignment theory would allow
Midland a deduction of $250 on its Utah franchise
tax return. The deduction would be computed as
the ratio of Midland's income to the incomes of
Midland and Montana, multiplied by the consolidated tax (1,000 -f- 2,000 x 500 = 250).
The Commission's method asserts that Alaska's operating loss "saved" $500 of federal tax. Midland is
assigned what the Commission says is a proper portion
of the "savings." The Commission seeks to lay hold upon
this Alaska item and to move it to Utah even though
it reflects business done solely in Alaska. The Commis-
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sion would not, it may be observed, seek to move any of
the Alaska operating loss to Utah for purposes of measuring Midland's franchise tax income. The fact of Alaska's
federal tax refund is ignored.
POINT 1.
THE DEDUCTIONS TAKEN BY MIDLAND AND
UTAH FOR FEDERAL TAXES PAID ARE DIRECTLY AND EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY SECTION
59-13-7, UCA 1953.

The Tax Commission response to Midland's first
point appears in Point III of its brief, p. 20, et seq).
The applicable statute, Sec. 59-13-7(3), authorizes
the franchise taxpayer to deduct "taxes paid or accrued." As concerns the application of such a statute to
cases like this, Midland cited three cases directly supporting its position, Cities Service Gas Co. v. McDonald, 204
Kan. 705, 466 P2d 277 (1970); Northern Natural Gas
Processing Co. v. McCoy, 197 Kan. 740, 241 P2d 190
(1967); and Massey-Ferguson Credit Corporation v.
Briggs, (Decision No. 48, Iowa Tax Board, 7/8/74). The
Commission's response is limited to the observation (p.
22) that by subsequent legislation, "The Kansas legislature effectively overruled the Cities Service case." This
is exactly Midland's point. The Utah statute authorizes
the deduction Midland took. If the law of Utah is to be
altered, the legislature is the appropriate agent of government to effect the change.
There is no authority contrary to Midland's position.
The case relied upon by the Commission, Trunkline Gas
Co. v. Collector of Revenue (La. App. 1965), 182 So2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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674, is not in point. The Commission's description of the
holding is not correct. The Commission omits any mention of the statute, R.S. 47:241, and regulation, ITR
55.2, on which the decision is based. The statute directs
an apportionment of the federal income tax deduction
and explicitly empowers the Collector to make rules and
regulations to do so. The Kansas court declined to follow
Trunkline, as Kansas had no such statute and no such
regulation. The Utah situation is the same as that in
Kansas.
Moreover, the Lousiana allocation method upheld in
the Trunkline decision differs fundamentally from that
sought to be imposed here by the Utah Commission. The
Louisiana regulation does not ignore the tax refund payments, as the Utah Commission would seek to do; instead,
such payments are taken into account in the computation.
The last sentence of the governing regulation, as quoted
in the decision (182 So.2d, at 678), so provides.1 To be
accurate about the matter, Trunkline is contrary to the
position taken by the Utah Commission.
The Commission's brief attempts a showing (pp. 15,
19), that "[substantial benefits were given the members
of the consolidated group by the filing of Continental's
consolidated federal return." Except for the matter of
the offsetting of losses against gains, none of these had
been mentioned in the Commission's findings. The Comi ' T o r this purpose, the amount of Federal income tax paid by a corporation shall be deemed to be the sum of payments it makes to the Federal
Government and payments it makes to any other corporation of the consolidated group in discharge of the tax obligation arising from the consolidation, minus the sum of any payments it receives from the Federal Government and the sum of any payments it receives from any other corporation
in the consolidated group in discharge of the tax obligation arising from the
consolidation."
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mission's theory of "benefits" is accordingly discussed in
Point 3 of this brief.
POINT 2(a)
THE DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS
ERRONEOUS INSOFAR AS IT IS BASED UPON
AN ALLOCATION PURPORTEDLY MADE UNDER
SECTION 59-13-17.

The statute referred to in the heading authorizes the
Commission to apportion or allocate income or deductions among affiliated corporations, whether or not they
do business in Utah, if the Commission determines that
such an allocation is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes
or clearly to reflect income.
Midland's first brief argued that the Commission did
not make the factual determination necessary to the application of the statute. The Commission response (p. 14)
is to claim that such a determination was made in Finding of Fact No. 14 by the recital that unless the audit
deficiency were sustained, it ". . . would cost the State
of Utah revenue." It is submitted that a mention of this
simplistic truism is not a "determination" of the kind
intended by Sec. 59-13-17. The Commission did not make
the factual determination necessary to call the statute
into operation nor did it even purport to do so. Given the
record, as a matter of law it could not.
The Tax Commission brief also suggests (p. 10) that
Sec. 59-13-17 is a statutory delegation of Commission
power to promulgate Regulation 13. That problem is
discussed in Point 2(c) below.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT 2(b)
THE DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS
ERRONEOUS INSOFAR AS IT IS BASED ON THE
KENNECOTT CASE.

The Commission's discussion of the Kennecott case
(Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 27 U2d 119, 493 P2d 632 (1972)) goes basically
to its claim that the decision upholds Regulation 13. This
idea is discussed in Point 2(c).
It is sufficient for the present point of the argument
to note the error of the Commission's statement (p. 18)
that: "The exact same method of apportioning and allocating the Federal income tax deduction in the Kennecott
case which was approved by this Court was applied in
the present situation to taxpayers." By the necessities of
the situation, the Commission cannot be right about that.
The factual differences between the two cases are so
marked that the apportioning procedures were necessarily very different. From the standpoint of a judicial precedent, Kennecott does not support the Commission argument.
POINT 2(c)
THE DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS
ERRONEOUS INSOFAR AS IT IS BASED UPON
REGULATION 13.

Most of the Commission's brief is given over to an
effort to save Regulation 13, and to justify its application to Midland during tax years 1965 through 1970.
Two legal obstacles face the Commission in this effort: First, as in effect during those tax years the regu-
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lation did not by its own terms apply to a case of this
kind. Second, the Commission lacks power to make it
applicable, by amendment or construction.
Regulation 13 was revised, after Midland's hearing,
by the addition of the new paragraph shown in the initial
brief. That the old regulation did not apply appears
clearly from a reading of sections relied upon by the
Commission in its Findings.2 Those address subjects
wholly different from what is involved in this case. The
Commission's re-write of Regulation 13, effective for
1973 and tax years thereafter, shows the correctness of
Midland's reading of the old regulation. The Commission's response (p. 16) to this argument is that it bears
similarity to the "subsequent repairs" evidentiary rule
(Rule 51, Rules of Evidence, which says that evidence
of subsequent repair measures is not admissable to prove
prior culpability or negligence). The assumed analogy
does not exist. It is obvious that that Commission revised
2
T h e Commission's Finding of Fact No. 12 reads in full as follows:
"12. U t a h Corporation Franchise T a x Regulation 13 provides:
Deductible Federal Income Taxes and Refunds Thereof — Allocation
of Federal Income Taxes. 1. Federal Tax Deductions to be Reduced by
Credits. T h e amount of federal income tax which may be deducted against
total corporate income for Utah income or franchise tax purposes is the
amount of the federal tax after all credits such as investment tax credits
(current and carryover), foreign tax credits, etc., have been deducted.
2. Cash Basis Taxpayer, (a) In the case of a taxpayer reporting on
the cash basis, the amount of federal income taxes actually paid during the
taxable period is allowable as a deduction, whether such taxes represent
the preceding year's tax or additional tax for prior years. Refunds of
federal taxes must be reported as income in the year received or offset
against payments made in that year and the net amount only of the
payments deducted.
3. Accrual Basis Taxpayer, (a) In the case of an accrual basis taxpayer, the amount of federal income tax to be allowed as a deduction in
arriving at the total corporate net income for Utah franchise tax purposes
is normally limited to the amount of the actual federal income tax liability
in connection with its federal return for the same period."
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Regulation 13 to make it say what it had not said before
the revision.
Viewed strictly, it may be enough to decide this case,
so far as concerns Regulation 13, to conclude that the
old regulation, effective during the tax years at issue,
does not apply. On this view, Midland's further showing
that the Commission has no authority to make the 1973
amendment would be superfluous.
This argument is advanced, however, in response to
the Commission's position that the 1973 addition only
restates what the regulation always said.
The Commission asserts power to make the new regulation on a number of theories:
(a) General power is said to be delegated in Art.
XIII, §11 of the Constitution, and by Section 59-5-46.
These delegate only as to procedural matters.
(b) The Commission claims authority in Section 5913-23(2). That statute empowers the Commission to
make substantive regulations governing affiliated groups
which file consolidated returns for Utah corporation
franchise tax purposes, A regulation based thereon has
valid authority for consolidated Utah return matters,
but it cannot apply here. Midland did not file a Utah
consolidated return.
(c) The Commission asserts that regulation-making
power comes from the allocation authority granted by
Section 59-13-17 governing the allocation of income deductions between several corporations controlled by the
same interests. By its own provisions, the statute does
not operate until after the Commission ". . . determines
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly
to reflect the income of such corporations." No such claim
was made here, no evidence to that effect was adduced
and no related findings made. That statute provides for
the examination of claimed distortions and provides the
state a remedy; it does not grant or imply a power to
legislate.
(d) The Commission asserts that the Kennecott case
holds that Regulation 13 is valid and that it applies to
situations like Midland's. Kennecott does not so hold.
That case involved a multi-state group of companies
reporting Utah income and non-Utah income, and filing
a consolidated corporation franchise tax return with the
Commission for Utah tax purposes. This court stated that
the Kennecott consolidated group "bound" its members
to the Utah regulations (493 P2d, at 636) by filing a
Utah consolidated return. The case does not support any
inference that it is within the Commission's statutory
power to write or re-write a new provision into Regulaton 13 applicable to Midland which did not so file.
Midland's brief made the point that the pattern of
the tax statutes, which extend substantive rule-making
power in some tax areas, and withhhold it in others
(including the taxes-paid deduction area), shows the
absence of delegated authority in the case of Rule 13.
The Commission's response (p. 14) assumes that Midland has made an expressio unius argument, and claims
that for some reason that rule is not valid in tax matters. Midland's point is more fundamental. The applicable rule is a matter of basic governmental law. This
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court said in Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission, .... U
, 531 P2d 1303 (1975), in connection
with powers of the Public Service Commission, that
(531 P2d 1303, at 1305):
In harmony with this it is well established that
a regulatory body such as the Public Service Commission, which is created by and derives its powers
and duties from statute, has no inherent regulatory powers, but only those which are expressly
granted, or which are clearly implied as necessary
to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities
imposed upon it [citations omitted].
That rule applies here with like force.
POINT 3
THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY MATTERS NEWLY RAISED HERE.

This part of Midland's brief discusses theories and
arguments that were neither presented to the Commission nor reflected in its findings and conclusions, but
are urged here for the first time.
(a) At pages 16-17 of its brief, and at page 19, the
Commission quotes from, and now relies upon, Sec. 4 of
Regulation 13.
Sec. 4 concerns itself with assignments of the federal
income tax deduction among the various items or divisions of a taxpayer. The references are to "items" and
"divisions" of one taxpayer's overall business and is applicable to multi-state operations of that business. There
is no reference to separate but affiliated corporations,
and thus in the present case there is no subject matter
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to which Sec. 4 can apply. The Commission was right
the first time to omit Sec. 4, and this afterthought does
not help its position.
(b) The Commission's brief attempts a showing (p.
15) that "[substantial benefits were given the parent
corporation and each member of the consolidated group"
by the filing of a consolidated federal return, mentioning
some ten listed in 7 CCH, Standard Federal Tax Reporter, ^4903.17. Another purported benefit is mentioned on
p. 19: ". . . taxes are reduced by moving in and out of
different percentage tax brackets, in general."
The Commission's findings refer only to one such
claimed benefit. Finding of Fact 6 mentions an assumed
benefit in the offsetting of operational losses against
profits. (In the example given in the statement of facts
of this brief, this would be the offsetting of the Alaska
loss against the incomes of Midland and Montana.)
That is the "benefit" on which the Commission based
its decision. The other matters are merely afterthoughts,
not considered at the time the decision appealed from
was made.
Moreover, the point is immaterial. The federal tax
laws levy the tax provided for; the local taxing authorities make other levies; the franchise tax law provides that
all these may be deducted. If some "benefit" in the
other taxes lessens their impact, then the franchise taxespaid deduction is lessened and the franchise tax increases.
The Commission's list of assumed benefits includes
the claim (p. 19) that on a consolidated return "taxes
are reduced by moving in and out of different percent-
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age tax brackets." The Commission was speaking only
generally, as the record and testimony show that no such
factor is or could be present in this case (Tr. 57-58).
In its Point II (p. 18) the Commission lists the four
methods provided in federal regulations for the computation of a consolidated return: (1) a taxable income
method; (2) a separate return method; (3) a tax increase allocation method; and (4) discretionary methods.
The basic fact in this case is that Midland's federal
return was computed on the separate-return basis. The
federal closing agreement with the IRS so provides, and
that method is also imposed by the regulatory commissions. The further basic fact is that the separate-return
method forecloses the benefits the Commission now
brings up.
(c) The Tax Commission brief suggests seven policy
reasons for its position, which are said to be "determinative." So far as these are accurately labeled "policy reasons" they are of course presented in the wrong forum.
So far as they constitute argumentation they are replied
to below, in the order appearing in the Commission's
brief (pp. 23-24).
(1) It is said that unless the Commission prevails,
the State is "deprived of vital revenues based on federal tax loopholes" that "large, corporate taxpayers" may
take advantage of by reason of their affiliations with
out-of-state interests, but of which "local, smaller competitors" may not take advantage.
The rhetoric need not be responded to. That aside,
the point is empty of real content. No federal loophole
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was taken advantage of by Midland, as the record demonstrates. As concerns the notion that Midland is given
advantage over smaller competitors, it can be noted that
Midland is a regulated monoply and is without a competitor of any size; apart from that, not many telephone
companies are more "local" than Midland, or "smaller."
(2) We are told by the Commission that it is the
Utah Legislature which should determine who is entitled
to a greater reduction in their taxable income, and that
it is the legislature which should set the guidelines if
affiliated companies are to get tax relief.
Midland would agree with this.
(3) The Commission states that it lacks authority or
ability to audit corporations not doing business in Utah
to determine whether the amount contributed by the
Utah taxpayer was reasonable in light of the total federal tax liability.
The argument is incorrect. Section 59-13-17 provides
otherwise and this case demonstrates otherwise.
(4) The Commission complains that the Utah taxing
authorities have no control over the parent corporation
to compel it to assess its subsidiaries only in an amount
equal to their tax liability.
It is accurate to say that the Commission has no such
control or power of compulsion. Nor should it. If what
is meant is that the Commission may not, for franchise
tax purposes, disallow an excessive "assessment," then the
statement is simply wrong.
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(5) We are told that the State of Utah should not
be required to subsidize the elimination of inter-company
profits and transactions between affiliated groups by
granting relief from Utah taxes.
This platitude has nothing to do with the present case.
If it is the Commission's notion that Midland or
Continental have found a way to do away with federal
taxes on inter-company transactions, then the Commission is wrong. The treatment of profits upon Continental's inter-company transactions, for federal income tax
purposes, was shown the Commission and is before the
Court as reflected in testimony and in the closing agreement with the Internal Revenue Service (Exhibit 16).
That agreement does not "eliminate" the profit or the
tax on these transactions but defers them (or takes account of them in increments) over the life of the plant
item. As the Midland witness stated, the profit is attributed to the operating utility. The benefit obtained by
deferring the tax is that the borrowing costs of the utilities are lessened. This of course raises income, and this
raises the franchise tax. The Commission is arguing with
itself.
(6) The Commission tells us that the corporation
franchise tax is upon the privilege of exercising a franchise with all corporate benefits within the state, based
upon the percentage of taxable income, and that the
reduction of the franchise fee necessarily discriminates
against intra-state domestic corporations.
The short answer is that no "reduction" is present.
Midland's deduction for federal taxes paid was the same
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as it would have been if no federal consolidated return
had been filed. The Commission has assumed its answer
before commencing any analysis of the problem. Indeed,
it is the Commission which seeks to bring in outside factors to vary Midland's taxable Utah income because of
occurrences outside this state.
(7) As a final item, the Commission argues that
"Adoption of appellant's recommendation necessarily
ties the State of Utah to everchanging Federal tax regulations in the area of consolidated returns and may result
in undesirable revenue loss and other adverse effects to
the State of Utah should the government change its fedral tax laws for fiscal or other reasons. Again, local
regulations are pushed back up to a federal level."
The argument is a legislative argument. It may be
observed that during all of the history of the Utah income tax, upon persons and upon corporations, we have
all been accustomed to deducting the taxes levied by
other tax-laying authorities. If the tax collector wishes
this fundamental pattern changed, it has chosen the
wrong forum in which to make the effort.
Midland cannot forebear the observation that the
Commission's arguments and its "policy" presentation
bespeak a preoccupation with matters other than the
one before the Court. Midland's case is its own
case. Midland is a taxpayer which, because of the
separate-company accounting method laid out for it and
because of its intensely regulated way of life as a public
utility, does not present a case of the kind the Commission affects to be concerned about. It is time for a deeiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sion of the Court that the Commission is and has been
wrong about this case, on its merits.
CONCLUSION
Tax Commission Decision No. 288 is incorrect and
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
John W. Horsley
O. Wood Moyle III
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